Market Timing of New Equity Offerings: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms by Ma, Shiguang & Rath, Subhrendu
Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal 
Volume 10 Issue 2 Article 3 
2016 
Market Timing of New Equity Offerings: Evidence from Chinese 
Listed Firms 
Shiguang Ma 
Unviersity of Wollongong, Australia, shiguang@uow.edu.au 
Subhrendu Rath 
Curtin University, Australia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj 
Copyright ©2016 Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal and Authors. 
Recommended Citation 
Ma, Shiguang and Rath, Subhrendu, Market Timing of New Equity Offerings: Evidence from 
Chinese Listed Firms, Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 10(2), 2016, 
23-53. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v10i2.3 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Market Timing of New Equity Offerings: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms 
Abstract 
A well-established paradigm of the developed financial market is that firms take advantage of market 
valuations to make financial decisions. Do firms operating in a highly controlled market follow similar 
financial strategies? We find that the new equity offerings of Chinese listed firms are strongly associated 
with market valuations. However, the market timing effectiveness is relatively lower in the firms owned by 
the State and in the time when firms conduct non-tradable share reform by liquidating non-tradable 
shares. We also find that the proceeds from equity offerings are expended more in the form of 
opportunistic and discretionary usage than investment requirements. Our empirical evidence supports the 
general applicability of the equity market timing theory to the highly controlled emerging market of China. 
Keywords 
Market timing, new equity offerings, state ownership, non-tradable shares reform, China 
This article is available in Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj/vol10/
iss2/3 
AABFJ  |  Volume 10, no. 2, 2016 
 
 
Market Timing of New Equity 
Offerings: Evidence from Chinese Listed 
Firms 
 






A well-established paradigm of the developed financial market is that firms take advantage of 
market valuations to make financial decisions. Do firms operating in a highly controlled 
market follow similar financial strategies? We find that the new equity offerings of Chinese 
listed firms are strongly associated with market valuations. However, the market timing 
effectiveness is relatively lower in the firms owned by the State and in the time when firms 
conduct non-tradable share reform by liquidating non-tradable shares. We also find that the 
proceeds from equity offerings are expended more in the form of opportunistic and 
discretionary usage than investment requirements. Our empirical evidence supports the 
general applicability of the equity market timing theory to the highly controlled emerging 
market of China. 
 
JEL Classification: G30, G32 
 
Keywords: Market timing, new equity offerings, state ownership, non-tradable shares 
reform, China. 
  
                                                          
1 University of Wollongong, Wollongong, Australia, shiguang@uow.edu.au 
2Curtin University, Perth, Australia  
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Lakshman Alles, Pat Fraser, Elaine Laing and participants at the 
Financial Markets and Corporate Governance conference (Wellington, 2014) and the Accounting and Finance 
Association of Australia and New Zealand (Perth, 2013) for helpful comments and suggestions. 





The market timing of equity issuance is a special case where the sale of new shares is 
undertaken at times when the share price is high. According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
high market valuations are the first-order determinants of equity issuances and help explain 
capital structure adjustments of US firms. Primarily designed for a developed financial 
market such as the US, a key assumption behind the market timing arguments is that current 
high market valuations provide opportunities to issue equities at lower cost to the current 
shareholders. The empirical results of the timing theory by Baker and Wrugler (2002) and 
Welch (2004), among others, have been quite conclusive in this regard in the US where the 
firms are expected to follow the shareholder wealth maximisation principle. 
 
In addition, a test of the market timing theory in an economic environment other than the US 
provides a robustness test for the empirical regularities observed for the US market. Mahajan 
and Tartaroglu (2008) find the evidence for market timing in G-7 countries to be mixed. 
Louhgran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) provide substantial evidence that market timing is a 
significant factor in IPOs, especially for countries in the region of emerging East Asian 
countries. Despite the controversy and importance of market timing as an alternate model to 
pecking order and trade-off theories of capital structure, investigation of market timing of 
equity offerings in non-US countries is still sparse. In particular, an investigation on market 
timing of equity offering in the largest emerging market of China is unlikely to be cited. This 
research intends to fill the void. We believe ours is among the precursory papers to undertake 
a comprehensive examination of the market-timing issue for the Chinese market.  
 
In this paper we posit that the new equity offerings of Chinese listed firms are partly 
motivated by market timing issues. If the highly controlled emerging market is based without 
regard to equity market conditions, the new equity offerings should not correlate with timing 
opportunities. On the other hand, evidence of market timing by Chinse listed firms would 
mean that, similar to the firms in developed economies, the Chinese authorities and firms also 
take into account the market conditions and attempt to maximise the efficiency of equity 
offerings while raising capital. To the extent equity market timing represents opportunity of 
wealth transfer from minority and new shareholders to the current controlling shareholders, 
which would affirm the validity of shareholder wealth maximisation incentives even for the 
highly controlled emerging market of China. 
 
Within the paradigm of shareholder wealth maximisation, transfer of wealth from minority 
shareholders to the controlling shareholders can take many forms. In the Chinese context, the 
share issuances and state ownership divestiture programs are either highly controlled or 
mainly mandated by government and therefore assumed to be independent of market 
conditions in some extent. Hence it is not clear that the shareholder wealth maximisation 
principle and the ensuing mechanism of equity timing would be applicable to a controlled 
economy such as China and as such presents an open empirical question.  
 
The equity financing and its timing are important for firms of developed economy, which has 
been well addressed in literature (Baker & Wrugler, 2002; Welch, 2004; Mahajan & 
Tartaroglu 2008). In many respects, the Chinese financial market system serves as a counter 
example to established findings in corporate finance literature (Allen et al., 2005). Even 
though the market timing arguments suggest that managers should take advantage of 
favourable market conditions, the Chinese listed firms are greatly controlled to issue equity 
per se for the following reasons. First, new equity offering as a financing option is tightly 
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controlled by the Chinese Securities and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and is typically 
available to only a fraction of listed firms. For example, an application for secondary equity 
offering can only be made after 12 months of previous initial public offerings (IPOs) or 
secondary equity offerings (SEOs) and the applicants should have positive earnings prior to a 
SEO requiring further checks by the CSRC (Zou & Xiao, 2006).  
 
Second, due to political and social concerns, the Chinese government assists state owned 
enterprises (SOEs)  in which it retains a large stake in securing bank loans rather than seeking 
external capital via equity (Tian & Estrin, 2008). This is especially applicable in China where 
the banking industry is highly controlled and state owned. State controlled firms are likely to 
have better access to bank loans, thereby alleviating the need to raise equity. Also, the state 
ownership acts as a strategic control, due to concerns of dilution of state influence, when new 
equity is issued (Xu & Wang, 1999). For these reasons, evidence of association between 
market valuation and new equity offerings would be a strong support for the proposition that 
market timing, in a manner similar to firms in developed markets, is also a powerful 
financing opportunity for state owners, even when there are no compelling reasons for the 
opportunity to be taken advantage of.  
 
Finally, a significant market structure change may deter market timing effect. In particular, 
the change is due to seriously mandated policy that has been implemented in a short period. 
For example, before 2005, when a company went to public through initial public offering 
(IPOs), the state owned and legal person ownership were converted into shares that were non-
tradable in the secondary market. The share price of a firm with a large proportion of non-
tradable shares was usually distorted to represent its market value. Thus, China commenced 
non-tradable share reform from 2005, which required firms to liquidate their non-tradable 
shares in several scheduled years. Indeed, by the end of 2007, nearly all state controlled firms 
that had non-tradable shares had completed the share reform and represented more than 97% 
of non-tradable shares.   
 
Nevertheless, we find that overall market timing plays a significant role in capital structure 
changes of Chinese corporations. The findings in our study suggest that Chinese listed firms 
raised new equity capital through SEOs during periods of favourable market conditions when 
equity valuations were high. The historical market-to-book ratios, weighted by the firm’s 
external equity financing (Baker & Wrugler, 2002), have an inverse relationship with 
leverage and changes in Chinese listed firms. This relationship is robust to alternative 
weighting schemes. However, market timing is indeed disturbed by firms’ ownership status 
and powerfully mandated policy. We find that market timing effectiveness is reduced when a 
firm is ownership controlled by state and in the period of non-tradable reform from 2005 to 
2010. We also examine persistency and pervasiveness effect of market timing by 
investigating cumulative leverage changes for 3, 5, 7 and 9 year periods after the IPOs. We 
find that the effectiveness of market timing is less persistent for state controlled firms in the 
years of their non-tradable share reform.   
 
To obtain a deeper understanding of the motivations behind the decision of new equity 
issuance and its correlation with state ownership, we analyse the subsequent uses of proceeds 
from equity offerings by examining balance sheet and cash flow statement items that are 
designed to distinguish between investment and discretionary uses of capital from equity 
offerings. Our regression estimates imply that high state ownership SOEs spend substantial 
amounts of capital from equity raisings to pay down long-term debt and build up cash 
reserves – a finding that suggests equity offerings, coinciding with high market valuations, 
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are primary sources of discretionary uses in years subsequent to the offerings. In contrast, we 
find that the low state ownership SOEs, as compared to the high state ownership group, 
allocate more funds from equity offerings towards investments, i.e., increase in capital 
expenditure and inventories.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section (section 2) is institution background that 
highlights the regulatory framework, security issuance processes and state owned non-
tradable share reform. Section 3 lays out our data characteristics and variable constructions. 
Section 4 explains metrologies and provides relevant empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes 
this research.  
2. Institution background 
 
Beginning from December 1978, China initiated economic reforms in an attempt to establish 
a ‘socialist market economy’ through a market-oriented readjustment of economic policies to 
reshape the centrally-planned economy. The reform strategies focussed on the diversification 
of the state ownership system, introduction of foreign capital (and technology), and efficiency 
improvements of the SOEs. The initial economic reform resulted in an unprecedented boost 
in industrial productivity and outputs. Nonetheless, two critical obstacles to the economic 
development were the scarcity of capital and inefficient use of fund. 
 
In order to address the issue of capital constraints in a state controlled economy, China’s 
authority embarked on a series of market oriented reforms beginning with the opening of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in April 
1991. In early periods, the listed firms were mostly profitable assets from the SOEs which 
have been either carved out or spun off and restructured into independent legal entities for 
listing purpose. The government’s primary aim in the establishment of stock markets was to 
seek additional external capital for the SOEs. Following listings, the state agencies 
maintained control of these firms as the state was usually the largest and controlling 
shareholder. However, over time, private firms (controlled by individuals and influential 
families) and other firms (such as controlled by collaborative entities or state agency 
representatives, which were termed as ‘legal person’ entities) were also allowed to list on the 
stock market.  
 
As indicated above, a defining characteristic of reform associated with the Chinese stock 
market is that a proportion of outstanding shares of SOEs and legal person ownerships are 
non-tradeable in the secondary market. The original purpose for Chinese government to 
develop a stock market was to attract funds from society and promote SOEs operation 
efficiency rather than liquidating state owned assets. The designation of non-tradable shares 
could either maintain a large size of ownership or exercise indirect state control following the 
public listing of the firm. When a firm is listed on the market, the state and legal person 
ownership of assets (as they are incorporated into the listed entity) are represented as non-
tradable shares, while the shares sold to the public are designated to be tradable and allowed 
for trading on the secondary market. Since many of the legal person ownerships of shares are 
affiliated with SOEs, effective state control was enforced through the non-tradeable status of 
these shares. For example, takeovers or mergers involving firms with large chunks of non-
tradeable shares would require government permission for ownership transfer. If the firms 
issue stock dividends or conduct right issues, the newly received or subscribed shares by the 
state or state representative agencies will accrue without affecting the overall proportionality 
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of state ownership and non-tradeable shares in the firm. Through these controls, the state had 
effective hold on the ownerships with ratios of non-tradable shares to total shares outstanding 
being 68.46% in 1997, 64.49% in 2000 and 59.60% in 2004. Nonetheless, following the non-
tradable share reform of 2005, these controls have started to decrease in a substantial manner.  
 
The effective control through state ownership combined with high proportions of non-
tradable shares engendered serious agency issues in these public firms. First, because the 
state is the ‘permanent’ controlling shareholders for many firms, the competitive discipline 
through the market for corporate control via mergers and takeovers was greatly diminished. 
In addition, the managerial skill sets of these firms, inherited from previous government 
structures, lacked the necessary corporate proficiencies impairing firms’ capabilities to 
compete in the product market. Second, the non-tradability of a large portion of shares made 
capital restructuring of firms to be largely ineffective. Finally, the non-tradeable shares 
created an artificial premium on tradable shares available for circulation and created a 
‘discount’ on the non-tradable shares3. Overall therefore, the equity prices were distorted and 
were not able to adequately signal changes in the supply and demand of equity capital.  
 
The problem associated with non-tradeable shares became quite evident by the end of 1999 
when the state attempted to circulate non-tradable shares and reduce the state ownership of 
publicly listed firms. In June 2001, the State Council promulgated “Temporary Provision to 
Reduce State Ownership and Ensure Social Security Fund”. This provision stipulated that the 
SOEs should sell 10% of state shares to the public in their IPOs or SEOs, and the proceeds 
would be used for the newly constituted Social Security Fund. This provision had the indirect 
effect of diluting the price of tradable shares. Faced with investor backlash, the CSRC on 
behalf of the State Council abolished this provision by the end of 2001.  
 
In 2005, the Chinese government instituted a major reform of non-tradable shares through the 
CSRC’s “Notice to Dispose Non-tradable Ownership of Listed Firms”. The new reform 
involved provisions to protect the value of tradeable shares. First, the non-tradeable 
shareholders were required to compensate for the value dilution of existing tradable shares in 
the form of additional shares, cash or options. Second, to mitigate the possible adverse 
market reaction, the reformed non-tradable shares would have to be in a commensurate lock-
up period before they are allowed to trade on the secondary market. For example, if the 
reformed non-tradable shares are less than 5% of the outstanding shares, the shareholders are 
allowed to trade the reformed non-tradable shares on the market only after 12 months. 
Owners with large holdings of reformed non-tradable shares were allowed to trade less than 
10% of the firm’s ownership after 24 months and the full quantity after 36 months. Third, the 
CSRC scheduled the 2005 reform in batches to minimise its market effect. For instance, the 
first batch of four firms participated in the pilot program of reform in 2005; the second batch 
constituted of 42 firms until June 2005 and the third batch of another 35 large firms joined 
the reform by November 2005. By the end of 2007, nearly all state firms that had non-
tradable shares had completed the share reform and represented more than 97% of China’s A-
share market capitalisation (Li et al, 2011). As a result of these reforms, the average state 
ownership and non-tradable shares have significantly reduced from 2006 to 2010: from 
30.31% to 9.31% for state ownership and from 50.01% to 18.36% for the non-tradeable 
shares.  
                                                          
3
   Chen and Xiong (2001) found that the average discount on non-tradable shares relative to their tradable 
counterparts is 77.93% and 85.59%, respectively, based on auction and agreement transfers. Green (2003) 
estimates that the non-tradable shareholders were, on average, paid only a tenth of the market prices on their 
equity holdings. 
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As the sole regulator of Chinese securities market, CSRC institutes policies and trading rules, 
monitors the market and participants, and controls the equity offerings. For example, the 
CSRC determines the sizes of new equity issuances of IPOs and SEOs each year based on the 
capacity of the capital market to absorb new shares. Through the stated objective to control 
supply of shares the CSRC attempts to artificially control the share price and avoid periodic 
market crashes that characterise developed share markets. In line with this objective, CSRC 
schedules a timetable of new listings each year and adjusts this timetable in terms of 
prevailing market conditions. For the SEOs, only right issues were allowed until the 
regulatory changes in 1998 which relaxed eligibility for SEOs. In order to carry out an SEO, 
a firm must meet time and accounting criteria. For example, a SEO should be after 12 months 
following the IPO or a prior SEO. The SEO firms should have positive earnings in past two 
years. These guidelines have been amended to the market condition (Zou & Xiao, 2006) but 
the access to capital market is generally restricted.  
 
Given the regulatory restrictions associated with capital raisings it was a preferable strategy 
for firms to issue small-scale IPOs to avoid large loss of under-pricing and then wait for a 
secondary issue later to take advantage of high valuations (Bo et al., 2011). In our 
untabulated results, we find that the total proceeds (rights and public offerings) of SEOs from 
2007 to 2010 ranges from 101.85 to 299.56 billion RMB while the corresponding range 
during the previous seven years (2001 to 2006) is only between 19.31 to 64.66 billion RMB. 
The high market valuation period from 2007 to 2010 coincides with periods of active SEO 
through right issues and secondary public offerings. Prima facie, it may therefore appear as a 
common goal for the listing firms, underwriters and the CSRC to use the SEOs as an 
opportunity to maximise the pricing of new issues.  
3. Sample and variables 
3.1. Sample description   
 
Our sample consists of firms listed on the Chinese stock markets during a sample period that 
spans from 2001 to 2010. The majority of our data are collected from the China Stock Market 
and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) developed by the Shenzhen GTA Information 
Technology Company and the University of Hong Kong. We supplement this data from 
Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistical Annuals, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Books and 
firms’ annual reports wherever necessary.  
 
The choice of the sample period (2001 to 2010) is due to the following considerations. First, 
although the economic reform in China had seen the establishment of stock markets prior to 
2001,  and the government’s intention to reduce state ownership of SOEs was announced in 
1994 and again in 1999, however, the state ownership reduction through non-tradable share 
liquidation was formally considered in earnest from 2001.  The impetus for state agencies to 
divest shares came only after the Ministry of Treasury decided to implement a Social 
Security Fund in 2001 (Ding & Graham, 2007). Second, the regulations concerning security 
issuance were not as established and settled as they were after 2001. Due to the uncertainty 
in regulation and the nature of stock trading in an emerging and highly controlled economy, 
the initial years of the development of the financial market created a supplier’s market with 
firms having artificially extreme market-to-book ratios. Finally, prior to 2000, the number of 
firms with available accounting information is too few in our dataset to conduct required 
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analyses. Thus, the observations in selected sample period satisfy our investigation of 
market timing for both secondary equity issuance and state ownership reduction.      
 
Because many Chinese listed firms were either carved out or spun off from existing SOEs, 
these firms were not independent entities before their IPOs and their pre-IPO data cannot be 
tracked. Thus, our investigation focuses on market timing of new equity offerings of listed 
firms after their IPOs. The new equity offerings of a listed firm is also defined as secondary 
equity offerings or seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), thus we will use SEOs for new equity 
offerings alternatively at convenience. Due to the above consideration, our sample 
construction is a modified version of the procedure used by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
Baker and Wurgler’s sample consists of observations that track firms from their pre-IPOs to 
the time they cease to exist in the sample. Their market timing on equity issuance consists of 
IPOs and SEOs. In our sample, if a firm’s IPO occurs during the sample period, we include 
observations from the first fiscal year after IPO to the last year it appears in the sample or 
2010, whichever is later. If a firm’s IPO occurs before the sample period, the firm-year 
observation begins from 2001. We include firms which had their IPOs prior to or after 2001, 
with their post-2001 accounting and security issuance data in our sample, since our primary 
motivation is to understand the new equity issuance of listed firms. This inclusion provided 
us with adequate sample sizes for our annual regression analyses. 
 
As is practice in studies of leverages, we remove financial firms from our sample as they are 
subject to special regulation and have special leverage characteristics. We eliminate firms 
with cross-listings in a stock exchange other than the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges 
to avoid biases in our inferences from a sample that may contain firms having access to 
capital sourced outside of China. We also exclude firms classified by the CSRC as either 
“special treatment” (ST) or “particular treatment” (PT) firms. The CSRC classifies firms as 
ST or PT if they have experienced negative profit for two and three consecutive years, 
respectively, and imposes additional restrictions on new equity financing. The firms with 
incomplete, erroneous (e.g. book debt ratio greater than one) are also removed. Our final 
sample consists of 10,299 firm-year observations.  
 
3.2. Variables  
 
We follow Fama and French (2000) definitions of accounting variables, as used in Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), and make necessary adjustment in terms of the Chinese data characteristics. 
We define book debt (D) as the difference between total assets (TA) and book equity. The 
book equity (E) is defined as total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus 
deferred taxes. The market value of total assets is total assets minus book equity plus market 
equity, while the market equity is the total number of common shares outstanding multiplied 
by year-end market prices. Leverage (D/TA) is either book or market leverage. Book leverage 
is debt divided by total asset and market leverage is debt divided by market value of total 
assets. As in Baker and Wurgler (2002), we drop firm-year observations where the book 
leverages are larger than one. Net equity issue (e/TA) is the change in book equity minus the 
change in retained earnings divided by total assets. ∆RE/TA is the change in retained earnings 
divided by total assets. Net debt issue (d/TA) is the residual change in assets divided by total 
assets. 
 
Our measure of market timing comes from Baker and Wurgler (2002). The innovative feature 
of Baker and Wurgler’s measure is the construction of a historical market-to-book ratio 
weighted by proportion of equity raisings. By weighting the market valuations with 
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proportions of equity that has been raised up to time t, it captures the timing effect of equity 
offerings at precisely the points at which the valuations are high. The historical market-to-
book ratio is computed/named as the external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio 
(EFWAMB) and is 






The EFWAMBt-1 of a firm is calculated for each firm-year (denoted by ‘s’) starting from the 
chronological year (denoted by ‘r’) the firm appears in the sample up to the year t-1. e and d 
represent the net equity issue and net debt issue as defined earlier. Baker and Wurgler set the 
negative weights to be zero and drop the firm-year observations where the EFWAMBt-1 
exceeds 10. Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008) set the negative weights to be zero and maximum 
value of EFWAMBt-1 to be 10. Considering the high volatility of Chinese market and to retain 
adequate number of observations, we set the negative weights to be zero and maximum value 
of EFWAMBt-1 to be 12. The Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure of market timing 
(EFWAMB), a combination of historical equity financing and historical M/B ratio, is weighted 
by past values making the movements of EFWAMB over time. A notable feature of Baker and 
Wurgler ’s EFWAMB measure is that it gives more weight to equity financing when M/B 
high. Thus, large EFWAMB represents market timing on equity offerings. 
 
The cross sectional variables uses in regressions are as follows. Tangibility is represented by 
net property, plant and equipment over total assets (PPE/TA). Profitability is measured as 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets 
(EBITDA/TA). Size is logarithm of sales (LogSale). State ownership ratio (StateRatio) is the 
number of shares owned by state divided by total number of shares outstanding. Tradable 
share ratio (TradeRatio) is the number of tradable shares divided by total number of shares 
outstanding. State control dummy (State) is 1 if the state ownership is greater than 30% and 
the state is the largest owner of the firm, otherwise codes zero4. Non-tradable shares reform 
dummy (ReformD) codes 1 for the years during which a firm commenced non-tradable share 
reform to end of its reform completion, otherwise is zero. We winsorize ratio variables at 
their 99% and 1% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
 
4. Methodologies and empirical analyses 
 
4.1. Leverage change, market-to-book ratios and EFWAMB 
 
The distributions of the cross-sectional variables designed for this study are presented in 
Table 1 (Tables appear at the end of this article). The average and median book and market 
leverages are around 50% and 30%, respectively. These estimates are similar to estimates 
found in studies of Chinese stock markets during this period (e.g. Qian et al., 2009). The 
mean market-to-book ratio is 2.1638 with the lower fifth percentile being close to one (i.e., 
0.9849) which indicates the general level of high market valuations for most of the firms 
during this period. While this evidence supports the overall growth-induced developing 
market outlook for the Chinese economy, the fact that high market-to-book ratios were 
pervasive it also points to possible overvaluation and mispricing during this period. For our 
                                                          
4
 30% ownership level is the criterion for effective control set by the CSRC in “Notice on Issuing ‘Guides to 
Constitutions of Listed Companies’”, December 16, 1997 (in Chinese, translated by the authors). 
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ownership and control related variables, the average and median values of StateRatio are 
around 25%. Our sample also includes firms having completed the non-tradeable share 
reform with the state ownerships being completely divested or the private firms without any 
state ownership. The average proportion of tradeable shares (TradeRatio) during the sample 
period is 55.58% indicating that close to 45% of shares on average were restricted from 
trading under the original imposed regulation, which is the target to be eliminated in the non-
tradable reform.  
 
Table 2 summarises the annual leverage and financing behaviour for our sample by calendar 
years. Over the sample years, the market leverage shows more variation as compared to book 
leverage. This variation reflects the overall market condition prevalent during this period. For 
example, the sharp increase of market leverage from 21.0% in 2007 to 38.88% in 2008 is a 
concomitant result of the market bubble in 2007 and subsequently slowdown due to the 
global financial crisis of 2008, which is in line with the contraction of global equity markets. 
The sources of financing show no discernible pattern over calendar time. However, the 
calendar wise proportions of debt financing appear to higher than the equity financing 
proportions. As Baker and Wurgler (2002) note, the comparison of the levels of debt versus 
equity financing can be misleading in calendar-time aggregates5. Hence we carry out the 
detailed cross sectional analyses later in the paper.  
 
In order to verify the effects of market conditions on financing decisions, we make a 
preliminary analysis of market-timing related variables on a calendar time basis. Since 
market timing hypothesis is based on the equity valuation (or misevaluation), both at the firm 
and aggregate levels, patterns of equity market movements should to be closely related to 
firm level market timing characteristics. Table 3 presents a year-wise movement of two 
equity market indices (Shanghai and Shenzhen composites) along with two firm level timing 
variables (M/B and EFWAMB) and two ownership related variables (StateRatio and 
TradeRatio). 
 
There are several evidences of note in Table 3. The first evidence is that the average M/B, not 
unsurprisingly, closely tracks the movement of the broader market indices. For example, the 
peak of the M/B ratio value (3.1125) occurs in 2007, the same year as the peaks of market 
indices. Further, the average M/B closely follows the general year to year pattern of the 
market indices. The second point to note is that the Baker and Wurgler (2002) measure of 
market timing (EFWAMB), a combination of historical equity financing and historical M/B 
ratio, is weighted by past values making the movements of EFWAMB over time slow to 
change . A notable feature of Baker and Wurgler ’s EFWAMB measure is that it gives more 
weight to equity financing when M/B high. This is indeed the case in Table 3. The EFWAMB 
changes very little and shows a gradual decline from 2001 to 2006 However, EFWAMB 
increases sharply in 2007 and remains high until 2010, even though the equity market drops 
off after 2007. 
 
The fact that EFWAMB stays high after 2007 can be attributed to the property of this 
weighted historical market-to-book ratio measure in that the large historical equity financing 
effects will persist into future EFWAMB measures. Nonetheless, the EFWAMB can also be 
                                                          
5
 “The table shows that on average, following the IPO, the annual change in assets is driven roughly 50 percent 
by net debt issues, 35 percent by net equity issues, and 15 percent by newly retained earnings. This is a broad 
generalization that hides wide cross-sectional variation, however, and indeed the change in assets is often 
negative.” Baker and Wurgler, 2002, p. 7. 
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driven by a recent-period equity financing activity if they are significantly large. In this 
paper, we conjecture that the state’s desire to liquidate non-tradable shares and decrease state 
ownership happens in conjunction with equity financings which, in turn, is partly motivated 
by high market-to-book ratios. We see partial evidence of this in the next two columns 
(labelled StateRatio and TradeRatio.) The StateRatio shows steady decline from 2005 to 
2010. Although this decline is gradual, the ownership level changes quite significantly from 
23.53% in 2008 to 13.04% in 2009 and 9.34% in 2010. Correspondingly, the TradeRatio, the 
measure of the proportion of non-restricted shares allowed for trading, steadily increases over 
the time. However it is possible that the mandated non-tradable reform could depress the 
market and affect the EFWAMB estimates of the firms that have both SEOs and non-table 
share liquidation. Untangling the market-timing motivation and non-tradable share reform is 
a major objective of our paper, and we provide further evidence of it in our cross sectional 
analysis. 
 
4.2 Sources of changes in leverage 
 
The first step in our analysis is the effect of market-to-book ratio on changes in leverage. 
Firms with high market-to-book ratio are likely to be high-growth firms and their capital 
needs may be funded from either debt or equity. We examine the association of the sources of 
annual financing needs to market-to-book ratio by decomposing the leverage change. 
Following Baker and Wurgler (2002), the annual changes in book leverage can be 
decomposed as follows: 
 












In equation (2), the change in leverage has three components: change in net equity issues 
(e/TA)t, change in retained earnings (∆RE/TA)t and the residual change in leverage  [(Et-
1)(1/TAt–1 - 1/TAt-1)], which depends on the asset growth. This decomposition follows the 
accounting identity of changes in the growth of assets must be equivalent to changes in 
liabilities. We regress each of the three components and the total change in leverage on the 
market-to-book ratio and four other independent variables. We use three control variables 
that are shown to be reliably related to changes in the leverage in its cross section in several 
developed countries (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Mahajan & Tartaroglu, 2007). They are the 
lagged values of asset tangibility (PPE/TA), profitability (EBITDA/TA) and firm size 
(LogSales). Since leverage is bounded by zero and one, the leverage is likely to revert 
towards mean when it is close to these boundaries, regardless of the effects of other variables. 
Therefore, we also include a lagged leverage (D/TA) to control for the mean reversion (Chen 
& Zhao, 2007; Chang & Dasgupta, 2009). The regression takes the form:  
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We also include the current market-to-book ratio in the form of M/Bt-1 in the regression 
specification. The inclusion of M/Bt-1 is an important feature of the empirical method of 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002). M/Bt-1 captures the immediate or current cross sectional effects of 
the market-to-book ratio on leverage can be attributed to current high growth opportunity and 
is isolated from its historical values.  
Ma & Rath | Market Timing of New Equity Offerings: China 
33 
 
Table 4 summarises the results of regressions in equation (3) related to equation (2). The 
results most likely have the similar explanation to that of Baker and Wurgler (2002). The first 
regression specification in Table 4 is the effects on overall change in leverage and the other 
specifications are based on the components of change in leverage. The results indicate that 
the effect of the market-to-book ratio is strongest when it is associated with the net equity 
financing component. The coefficient of the market-to-book ratio in regression 2 of Table 4 is 
-0.0064 (significant at the one per cent level) and more in magnitude than the coefficients in 
specifications 3 or 4 in its absolute value. Note that the entered sign on each of the sources of 
financing (dependent variables) of regression specification are negative, thus making the 
implied association to be positive (negative) when independent variables are negative 
(positive). In general, the estimates for the four Rajan and Zingales (1995) variables are 
consistent with prior results in the Chinese market (Qian et al., 2009). This finding of strong 
positive association between market-to-book ratio and leverage change, nonetheless, is 
consistent with the notion that the equity market timing attempts may be at work in Chinese 
capital markets during our sample period.   
 
Interestingly, the effect of market-to-book ratio is also positively related to changes in 
leverage due to changes in retained earnings (specification 3). This could be due to the ability 
of the market-to-book ratio to forecast future earnings (Baker & Wurgler, 2002).   The 
positive association of current market-to-book ratio (M/Bt-1) and leverage changes through 
equity financing implies that equity market timing may have a role in it, at least in the short 
run. Next we explore the market timing further by using the historical market-to-book ratios 
(as measured by EFWAMBt-1) and examine whether historical market valuations combined 
with non-tradable share reform and state ownership control can help explain changes in 
leverage ratios.  
 
4.3. Historical market-to-book ratios and market timing 
 
To take the historical market valuations into account for testing market timing in new equity 
issuance and the effects of state ownership control and non-tradable share reform on the 
market timing we take the form of regression:   
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The presence of EFWMBAt-1 therefore measures the historical (and residual) effects of the 
market-to-book ratios on leverage. If the market timing explanations are to be persuasive, the 
historical market-to-book ratio (EFWMBAt-1) should have a stronger and negative effect on 
leverage. The evidence of concurrent downward changes in leverage, which are correlated 
with high historical market-to-book ratios, confirms the powerful pull of equity timing 
opportunities (as documented by Baker & Wurgler, 2002). EFWMBAt-1*factor is an 
interaction variable in which factor represents either state ownership control or non-tradable 
share reform statue. It can be Statet-1 that is a binary variable equal to 1 if the state is the 
largest owner of the firm and the state ownership is larger than 30%, otherwise is zero. The 
state controlling and large ownership implies that state firms have advantage in debt 
financing by access to more bank loan, which may alleviate their initiative in marketing 
AABFJ  |  Volume 10, no. 2, 2016 
34 
 
timing of SOEs.  Alternatively, the factor can be ReformD that is a binary variable equal to 1 
for the years when a firm started non-tradable share reform to end of completion, otherwise is 
zero. The significant and negative coefficient of EFWMBAt-1*ReformD is also an evidence of 
market timing for liquidating non-tradable shares. The dependent variable of leverage ratio 
can be calculated in either market value or book value. Consistent results of regression on 
these two types of leverages would be strong evidence of market timing.  
 
Table 5 shows the results for the Fama-Macbeth regression of annual leverages with equation 
4. For an investigation in market timing on new equity offerings only we exclude interaction 
variable in regressions 1 and 3. It can be seen that the coefficients of EFWAMB are negative 
in all regressions. Regardless of whether the leverage is measured as book or market, the 
historical market-to-book ratio has the net effect of reducing leverage. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the weighted average market-to-book ratio (from Table 1) is 
associated with 2.77% change in book leverage (regression 1 in Table 5). This evidence of 
the negative relationship between historical market-to-book ratio and leverage supports the 
notion that market timing is an important mechanism through which Chinese listed firms 
conduct new equity offerings and thus seek to alter their leverages. 
 
Table 5 also shows that the state ownership control and non-tradable share reform policies 
adopted in China distort the effectiveness of market timing in SEOs. The coefficients of the 
interaction variable (EFWAMB*Statet-1) are negative with values of -0.0031 and -0.0004 in 
book leverage and market leverage regressions (regressions 2 and 4) respectively. They are 
quite smaller in absolute values than the coefficients of EFWAMB -0.0097 and -0.0135, with 
the significance down from 1% to 10% level. This evidence supports our conjecture that state 
controlled firms are likely to have better to access bank loans, because majority of large 
banks in China are owned by state. The advantage to access bank loans alleviates SOEs’ 
initiative and effectiveness in SEOs by timing the market.       
 
The coefficients of interaction variable EFWAMB*ReformD are -0.0044 and -0.0064 at 10% 
significance in book leverage and market leverage regressions (regressions 3 and 6), 
respectively. In comparison with the coefficients of EFWAMB -0.0120 and -0.0115 at 1% 
significance, both the absolute magnitude and the significance of the EFWAMB*ReformD 
coefficients are quite smaller. This result shows that the firms have less effectiveness to 
timing the market for their SEOs in their non-tradable reform years. Non-tradable share 
reform through liquidating non-tradable shares is mandatory as promulgated by the CSRC, 
which must be completed by the designated firms in a short period, such as two or three 
years. Although market timing is initiated at both government and firms’ levels, the market 
timing in liquidating non-tradable shares should be less likely observed. Non-tradable share 
reform implies that more shares will be circulated on the market and thus that depresses the 
market price of tradable shares. The firms in their non-tradable shares reform periods cannot 
time the market for their SEOs effectively.  
 
The current market-to-book ratio (M/Bt-1) represents current market valuation of equity, 
which is the main contribution to the historical market-to-book ratio (EFWAMBt-1). 
Throughout Table 5, both the coefficients of M/Bt-1 and EFWAMBt-1 are negative and 
significant at 1% in all regressions. High market valuation is accompanied by more equity 
issues and the decrease in leverage, and vice versa.  The evidences confirm the market timing 
on the SEOs in Chinese market, although the state ownership control and non-tradable reform 
dilute the market timing effect in some extent.  
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Amongst other variables, the effect of profitability (EBITDA/TA) on leverage is very large 
and significantly negative. The negative effect of profitability on leverage is well known 
empirical regularity in empirical literature using the US data that runs contrary to the 
predictions of trade off theory of capital structure6. It is therefore interesting to observe this 
relationship in the Chinese market as well. The coefficient of LogSale is also positive 
indicating that, to the extent that the size of the firm is proxied by sale, leverage ratios are 
positively related to size. Our results are also consistent with earlier evidences of Chinese 
capital structure determinants in the literature, e.g. Huang and Song (2006) and Qian et al. 
(2009). Overall, the results in table 5 show that historical market valuations have significant 
effect on the capital structure of Chinese firms. In addition, the state ownership is likely to 
have been divested in response to market valuations and reform policies. 
 
4.4 Alternative historical market-to-book ratios 
  
In order to obtain a robustness test, similar to Mahajan and Tartagoulu (2009), we 
repeat the leverage regressions utilising their alternate measures of historical market-to-book 
ratios: EQUITYWMB and EQUALWMB. The EQUITYWMB ratio is computed using weights 
in equation (1) for equity only, thus avoiding the problems of the EFWAMB if the equity 
issues were relatively less frequent than debt issues. In similar vein, the EQUALWMB uses 
equal weights for debt and equity issues and thus captures the simple-average effect of the 
historical market-to-book ratios and thus captures dynamic balancing of capital structure 
changes (Kayhan & Titman, 2007). 
 
We replace EFWAMB with EQUITYWMB and EQUALWMB respectively in equation 4 to 
tabulate the regression results in Table 6. The results in Panel A show that the estimates of 
the both EQUITYWMB and M/Bt-1 are negative and significantly at conventional levels. 
Nonetheless, the estimates of EQUITYWMB in book leverage regression become less 
significance at some extent.  This pattern holds when equal weighted historical average 
EQUALWMB ratio is used in the analysis in panel B,. More importantly, our interaction 
variables (EQUITYWMB*Statet−1, EQUITYWMB*ReformD, EQUALWMB *Statet−1, 
EQUALWMB*ReformD) continue to be negative but become insignificant in several 
regressions. Overall, the results in the robustness tests using alternative historical market-to-
book ratios are consistent with our prior main results.  
 
4.5 Cumulative leverage changes and the persistent effect of market timing.  
 
In our analyses so far we have documented that the high market valuations are associated 
with a decrease in leverage because of market timing on new equity issues. State controlling 
firms and firms in their non-tradable share reform years have less effectiveness in market 
timing over the new equity offerings. Moreover, we are noted that initially to maintain 
ownership control, state holds the largest proportion of non-tradable shares. State controlling 
firms are most likely the firms to implement non-tradable share reform in a mandated period. 
Although market timing is initiated at both government and firms’ levels, the effectiveness of 
market timing for SOEs in new equity issuance combined with liquidating non-tradable 
shares should be less persistent than sole secondary equity offerings which provides longer 
time and opportunity for firms to capture timing (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) In order to 
examine the persistency and pervasiveness effect of market timing in general we employ 
                                                          
6
 See Frank and Goyal (2009) for a discussion of the effects of firm characteristics on capital structure. 
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regressions on cumulative leverage change. Our tests use a modified Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) model of Equation 6 into following form: 
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Because we test the market timing of new equity offerings, all are events after IPOs, the 
dependent variable is the cumulative change in leverage from the first year after IPO to the 
reporting year, which is different from Baker and Wurgler (2002) cumulative change in 
leverage since pro-IPO. To capture the cumulative change in leverage accurately from the 
first year after IPO, we use the subsample of firms that have IPOs from 2000 to 2010. 
Therefore the cumulative change in leverage is calculated as First+3, First+5, First+7, and 
First+9 respectively, either in book value or market value. 
 
The same as in model 4, we include interactive variable EFWMBAt-1*factor that here is 
EFWMBAt-1* Statet-1* ReformD. Because the majority of non-tradable shareholder is state, 
this variable is for the test on the persistence of market timing effect over state controlled 
firms in their particular non-tradable state share reform period. The non-negative estimate of 
EFWMBAt-1* Statet-1* ReformD is an evidence of less persistence of market timing effect on 
the leverage change from new equity financing for the state controlled firms in their non-
tradable share reform years. 
 
Table 7 shows the regressions of cumulative changes in book and market leverage using 
model 5. For a robust comparison, we also arrange the regression results using a model by 
excluding the interaction variable from model 5. The regression excluding interaction 
variable is similar to that of Baker and Wurgler (2002) except for a difference that our 
cumulative leverage change is from the first year after IPO versus the pro-IPO year. It can be 
known from the regression results on the book value of cumulative leverage change in Panel 
A. The estimates of EFWMBAt-1 in specifications (1), (3), (5) and (7) are all negative and at 
1% significance, which is consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2002) results for U.S. market. 
Overall, the effect of market timing of secondary equity offerings is persistent on the leverage 
change of Chinese listed firms. The estimates of the EFWMBAt-1 in specifications (2), (4), (6) 
and (8) are all negative and at 1% significance as well. However, the estimates of interactive 
variables of EFWMBAt-1* Statet-1* ReformD are positive except one in IPO+9. Also it is 
marginal significant in IPO+5. All of the results support our conjecture that the effectiveness 
of market timing for SOEs in the period of their liquidating non-tradable shares is less 
persistent. 
 
The regression results on the market value of cumulative leverage change in Panel B look 
like no meaningful difference from those of Panel A. The estimates of the EFWMBAt-1 are 
negative and significant at 1% except for two in IPO+3. The estimates of EFWMBAt-1* Statet-
1*ReformD are positive but insignificant for all specifications. Because the non-tradable share 
reform is mandatory and is designed to be completed in a short period, the effectiveness of 
market timing for state controlled firms is less persistent than non-state controlled firms in 
sole new equity offerings, where firms have more relative flexibility in choosing time.  
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4.6 Market timing as a motivation for equity offerings      
 
The analyses presented so far establish a relation between the historical market book ratios 
and the decision in new equity issuance, particular, for the state controlling firms and firms in 
the years to complete non-tradable shares perform. In this section we examine this issue 
further and more directly by tracing the proceeds of share issues and to their usage in an 
analytical framework similar to that of Kim and Weisbach (2008), who estimate the uses of 
proceeds from a large sample of equity offerings. The decision of a secondary equity issue, 
after the initial public offerings, is presumably due to financing deficit generated by the 
firm’s investment decision. However, if a firm’s stock is overvalued, managers have 
incentives to take advantage of the market condition, the firm’s investment requirements 
notwithstanding. To the extent that high market-to-book ratios points to the presence of 
growth opportunities in the stock price (rather than misvaluation or timing opportunities), we 
should expect proceeds from share issues associated with high M/B ratios go to fund future 
investments. Alternately, if high M/B ratios, as a result of mispricing, lead to equity issues, 
we expect the proceeds to be used for discretionary purposes such as build-up of cash 
reserves.  
 
The above argument regarding the motivation for new equity offerings (market timing versus 
investment requirement) requires us to make a distinction between equity offerings and other 
sources of funds. If the market timing rationale is the overriding reason for the state agencies 
to issue equity, then the use of proceeds for such equity issues towards discretionary 
expenditures will be relatively higher as compared to proceeds from non-equity offerings. 
Alternately, if firms primarily use equity capital to fund investments, then we should be able 
to predict changes in investments uses following the equity capital raisings (Pagano, Panetta 
& Zingales, 1998; Kim & Weisbach, 2008). We measure changes in four accounting 
variables from the balance sheet and cash flow statements and match them to funds available 
from equity and non-equity sources. The accounting variables are: (1) cumulative changes in 
long term debt ∑LTDebt, (2) changes in cash holdings ∆Cash, (3) cumulative changes in 
capital expenditures ∑CAPEX, and (4) changes in inventory ∆INV. The first two variables 
measure possible discretionary uses of funds (other than direct investment needs) while the 
last two variables are intended to capture possible ways in which the proceeds are invested in 
real assets.  
 
The changes in these variables are scaled by the total assets available at a benchmark date 
(t=0). For balance sheet items (cash and inventory), the changes are measured annually as ‘Y’ 
as follows. 
 
@ = -./ ABCBDEFD 	+ 1G		 , 
 
where Vt stands for cash and inventory, alternately. TA0 is the total assets in the year 
immediately after the IPO and t is the number of years after 0. The effect of outliers are 
minimised by log transformation. For the measures that are obtained from cash flow and 
income statement (reduction in long term debt and capital expenditure), we use the log plus 
the accumulation in each variable while normalising by TA0.  
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To gauge the relative influence of sources of funds from equity offerings versus non-equity 
capital raisings on subsequent uses of capital, we employ a specification similar to Kim and 
Weisbach (2008) that allows a distinction between the two. Further, this regression approach 
allows us to estimate marginal changes in uses of funds given a $1 change in new capital 
infusion. Chinese firms are prohibited to issue shares during the first year after the IPO, our 
measurement of proceeds of capital issues and changes in accounting variables start at the 
second year following IPO and measured for four years thereafter (i.e., t=2, 3, 4 and 5). For 
each of these years, we designate ‘eqt’ as the ratio of new capital from equity offerings to TA0 
and ‘oth’ as the corresponding ratio of incremental capital from all other sources to TA0.
7  We 
then create three binary ownership variables that interact with these sources. To create the 
binary interacting variables, we first sort the sample by state ownership ratio in each year  
and then place them in three equal sized tercile groups to create three dummy variables (LO, 
MED and HI) indicating whether the firm is in the low ownership, the medium state 
ownership, or the high state ownership group, respectively. These three dummy variables 
interact with capital sources designated as ‘eqt’ or ‘oth’.  Specifically, for each of our four 
measures of possible uses of capital (Y), we estimate 
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To test this proposition, we construct a subsample of firms that have IPOs in our main sample 
period from 2001 to 2010. Therefore, we are able to measure cumulative changes in capital 
allocation precisely from the first year after IPOs to a certain year. Since some firms have no 
capital raisings through SEO or other methods in a particular year, the number of firm-year 
observations is shrunk and less than previous analyses.  
 
Table 8 reports estimates of equation (6), omitting β7 through β9 and the calendar year fixed-
effects for the sake of brevity. This table shows two dimensions of uses in comparison: (1) 
differences in the ownership levels of firms in low, medium and high state ownership groups, 
and (2) differences in the sources of capital between equity (‘eqt’) and non-equity (‘oth’) 
offerings. The estimates in Table 7 imply that, when funds are sourced from equity issues, 
high state ownership firms use more capital to pay down the debt, build up cash holdings and 
spend less towards capital expenditures and inventory as compared to low state ownership 
firms. For example, coefficients on the capital raised in equity offerings are generally higher 
than the corresponding coefficients for other sources of capital in the equations estimating 
changes in cash. (For the low ownership category (LO), the estimates for ∆Cash for all the 
years (t=2, 3, 4 and 5) are higher when the dependent variable is equity funding (i.e., column 
marked ln(1+eqt)*LO)) as compared to other sources (column marked ln(1+oth)*LO)). This 
evidence suggests that the new capital raised via equity is more likely to be saved as cash. In 
order to interpret these coefficients more meaningfully in economic terms, we provide 
marginal effects of these estimates in Panel B of Table 6 and discuss them below.  
 
In Panel B, following Kim and Weisbach (2008), we calculate the effects of new capital by 
calculating the implied change across all four uses from the regression estimates of Panel A 
                                                          
7
 We compute total source of funds as the sum of funds from operations, sale of plants and other assets, new 
debt issues and equity issues. We subtract equity issues from total funds to obtain funds from other sources. 
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that sheds a more useful economic insight on these estimates. High state ownership firms 
appear to spend $0.028, $0.004 and $0.015 for each dollar of equity financing at t=2, 3 and 5 
years, respectively, as compared to $0.024, $0.002 and $0.014 for the low state ownership 
firms for the corresponding periods. The p-values for the differences in the coefficient 
estimates are also statistically significant at five precent significance level. For change in cash 
holdings, both high and low state ownership groups appear to build up cash reserves more 
when the capital is sourced from equity offerings as compared to non-equity offerings. 
However, this difference is more pronounced for high state ownership firms. For example, 
the difference between marginal implied dollars between equity and non-equity offerings for 
cash holdings in t=2 is $0.237 ($0.310 vs. $0.073) for the high state ownership firms as 
compared to the corresponding difference of $0.200 ($0.223 vs. $0.023) for low state 
ownership firms.  These differences are even more when compared over longer time periods 
of t=3, 4 and 5. In addition, the estimates imply that for each $1 raised via equity offerings, 
low state ownership firms spend more funds towards capital expenditure (∑CAPEX) and 
inventory (∆INV) than do high state ownership firms. For example, except for t=2, the 
marginal dollar spent towards capital expenditure via equity financing is lower during each of 
the time periods for high state ownership firms as compared to the implied expenditures for 
low state ownership firms. Similarly, the high state ownership firms appear to spend less 
toward inventory.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that the state ownership levels and the source of capital are 
related to category of uses of funds. High state ownership firms appear to use the proceeds 
from equity offerings to channel towards discretionary usage while low state ownership firms 
are likely to use the proceeds for investment purposes. This finding coincides to the argument 
that state controlled firms can easily access bank loans for investment than non-state 





The market timing hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler (2002) suggests that historical valuations 
(as measured by weighted average of historical market-to-book ratio) have significant 
explanatory power of capital structure determination of corporations. We apply this 
hypothesis to Chinese publically listed firms in privatization process which has significantly 
altered China’s economy from being a state dominated enterprise system to robust private 
capital market.  
 
In this paper we posit and provide evidence that the new equity offerings of Chinese listed 
firms are linked to opportunistic times when market valuations were high. We find that 
market timing is a general practice for Chinese listed firms to raise capital through new  
equity offerings. However, the effectiveness of market timing is weak for state controlling 
firms. The possible explanation is that state controlling firms have the advantage to access 
bank loans whenever they request, which reduce the incentive to finance equity by market 
timing.  
 
Furthermore, firms implementing non-tradable share reform also have low effectiveness of 
market timing in equity financing. Because non-tradable share reform is a mandated policy 
that has been implemented in a short period, not only the chance of market timing is minimal, 
but also liquidating non-tradable shares suppresses share price.  
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Finally, considering the fact that state controlling firms are the largest non-tradable 
shareholders and thus have to implement non-tradable share reform in required years, we 
examine the persistency and pervasiveness effect of market timing for those firms. Evidences 
show that the effect of market timing is indeed less persistent and pervasive for the state 
controlling firms in the years of their liquidating non-tradable shares.  
 
Our further evidences concerning capital uses show state ownership levels and the source of 
capital are related to category of uses of funds. High state ownership firms appear to use the 
proceeds from equity offerings to channel towards discretionary usage while low state 
ownership firms are likely to use the proceeds for investment purposes.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
This table presents the annual summary statistics of variables used. The sample consists of firms listed on the Chinese stock market from 2001 to 2010. Book leverage, 
(D/TA)book, is defined as debt divided by total assets. Debt is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock 
plus deferred taxes. Market leverage, (D/TA)market, is debt divided by market value of assets (total assets minus book equity plus market value of equity). M/B is market value 
of total assets divided by book value of total assets. EFWAMB is external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio, calculated using equation (1) in text. EQUITYWMB 
is equity weighted average market-to-book ratio that is calculated by using only equity issue (e) weights in equation (1). EQUALWMB is equal weighted average market-to-
book ratio that is calculated by using only equal weights in equation (1). EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. PPE is net property and 
plant plus equipment. LogSale is the logarithm of revenue. StateRatio is the number of state shares divided by total number of shares outstanding. TradeRatio is the number 
of tradeable shares divided by total number of shares outstanding. If a firm’s IPO occurs during the sample period, the firm-year observations of our sample include 
observations from the first fiscal year after IPO to the survival year or 2010. If a firm’s IPO occurs before the sample period, the firm-year observations are from 2001 to the 
survival year or 2010. Total number of firm-years is 10299. 
 Mean S.D. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
(D/TA)book 0.4908 0.1804 0.1762 0.3647 0.5014 0.6249 0.7692 
(D/TA)market 0.3037 0.1833 0.0554 0.1553 0.2743 0.4292 0.6410 
M/B 2.1638 1.7579 0.9849 1.2963 1.7579 2.5718 4.8527 
EFWAMB 3.4695 2.4476 1.2777 1.8069 2.5627 4.0775 12.0000 
EQUITYWMB 3.3417 2.2751 1.2951 1.8432 2.5498 3.8944 12.0000 
EQUALWMB 2.4753 1.1644 1.2398 1.6641 2.1629 2.9456 4.7568 
EBITDA/TA 0.0624 0.0794 -0.0653 0.0358 0.0612 0.0975 0.1782 
PPE/TA 0.2988 0.1849 0.0285 0.1592 0.2725 0.4254 0.6351 
LogSale 9.0306 0.6330 8.0724 8.6510 9.0132 9.3887 10.1064 
StateRatio  0.2653 0.2539 0.0000 0.0000 0.2488 0.4920 0.6800 
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Table 2: Leverage and sources of financing 
This table reports mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of book leverage, market leverage, net debt issues, net equity issues and change in retained earnings from 
2001 to 2010. Debt (D) is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Book leverage, 
D/TAbook , is defined as debt divided by total assets. Market leverage, D/TAmarket , is debt divided by market value of assets (total assets minus book equity plus market value 
of equity). Net equity issue (e/TA) is the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings divided by total assets. ∆RE/TA is the change in retained earnings 
divided by total assets. Net debt issue (d/TA) is residual change in assets divided by total assets. Our sample consists of the firms listed on the Chinese stock market during 
the sample period from 2001 to 2010. If a firm’s IPO occurs during the sample period, the firm-year observations of our sample include observations from the first fiscal year 
after IPO to the survival year or 2010. If a firm’s IPO occurs before the sample period, the firm-year observations are from 2001 to the survival year or 2010.  
Year N  D/TAbook D/TAmarket  d/TA e/TA ∆RE/TA 
Mean  S.D Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D Mean  S.D Mean  S.D 
2001 672 0.4428 0.1727 0.1981 0.1178  0.0412 0.1681 0.042 0.1015 -0.0124 0.0781 
2002 809 0.4519 0.1724 0.2470 0.1412  0.0510 0.1538 0.0186 0.0732 0.0035 0.0712 
2003 898 0.4632 0.1784 0.2989 0.1596  0.0662 0.1494 0.0238 0.0591 0.0198 0.0533 
2004 964 0.4865 0.1752 0.3623 0.1728  0.0652 0.1498 0.0205 0.0598 0.0093 0.0711 
2005 1015 0.5037 0.1788 0.4281 0.1884  0.0458 0.1444 0.0020 0.0742 0.0087 0.0859 
2006 1099 0.5084 0.1789 0.3585 0.1825  0.0466 0.1631 0.0183 0.0647 0.0115 0.0464 
2007 1089 0.5051 0.1752 0.2100 0.1317  0.0722 0.1518 0.0488 0.1018 0.0310 0.0561 
2008 1167 0.5039 0.1813 0.3888 0.1932  0.0372 0.1665 0.0139 0.0983 0.0121 0.0542 
2009 1274 0.4998 0.1844 0.2489 0.1614  0.0658 0.1427 0.0312 0.0697 0.0215 0.0451 
2010 1312 0.5053 0.1870 0.2679 0.1862  0.0836 0.1243 0.0334 0.0782 0.0268 0.0375 
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Table 3: Market-timing variables and movements of Chinese stock markets  
This table reports the market timing related variables and the movements of the Chinese stock market from 2001 to 2010. M/B is market value of total assets divided by book 
value of assets. EFWAMB is external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio, calculated using equation (1) in the text. StateRatio is the number of state shares divided 
by total number of shares outstanding. TradeRatio is the number of tradeable shares divided by total number of shares outstanding. 





Composite Index  
Shenzhen (SZS) 
Component Index 












2001 672 2.7153 1.2289 3.8007 2.2892 0.3198 0.2621 0.4044 0.1290 1646 1941 204 3326 4186 636 
2002 809 2.2222 1.0662 3.7086 2.3661 0.3279 0.2647 0.4005 0.1240 1358 1561 109 2759 3153 234 
2003 898 1.7936 0.7343 3.4202 2.3979 0.3772 0.2561 0.4029 0.1224 1497 1468 69 3480 3223 154 
2004 964 1.5149 0.5788 3.1980 2.3811 0.3735 0.2553 0.4040 0.1218 1267 1468 156 3068 3466 315 
2005 1015 1.3020 0.4807 2.9693 2.2758 0.3576 0.2520 0.4201 0.1251 1161 1145 68 2864 2938 215 
2006 1099 1.7142 0.9176 2.9603 2.2910 0.3031 0.2303 0.4996 0.1347 2675 1687 396 6647 4329 975 
2007 1089 3.1125 1.5895 3.2373 2.2688 0.2696 0.2212 0.5758 0.1527 5262 4329 1064 17701 13782 4320 
2008 1167 1.5091 0.6929 3.2827 2.3699 0.2353 0.2203 0.6318 0.1883 1821 2913 944 6486 10327 3640 
2009 1274 2.6102 1.3005 3.3156 2.3034 0.1304 0.2082 0.7587 0.2472 3277 2737 455 13700 10812 2274 
2010 1312 2.6512 1.5357 3.3228 2.2242 0.0934 0.1861 0.8164 0.2374 2808 2796 215 12459 11631 1127 
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Table 4: Determinants of annual leverage changes  
 
This table presents aggregated estimates from the Fama-Macbeth annual regressions from 2001 to 2010. 
[(D/TA)t - (D/TA)t-1] is the change in book leverage. D/TA is the book leverage defined as debt divided by total 
assets (TA). Debt (D) is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total 
liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Net equity issues (e/TA) is the change in book equity minus 
the change in retained earnings divided by total assets. ∆RE/TA is the change in retained earnings divided by 
total assets. [(Et-1)(1/TAt–1 - 1/TAt-1)] is the residual change in leverage. M/B is market value of total assets 
divided by book value of assets. PPE is net property and plant plus equipment. LogSale is logarithm of revenue. 
EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. t-statistics are in parentheses. ‘***’, 
‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively.  
 Dependent variable 1
D D
TA TAt t
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Table 5: Determinants of leverage and state ownership 
This table presents aggregated estimates from the Fama-Macbeth annual regressions from 2001 to 2010. Book leverage, D/TAbook 
is defined as debt divided by total assets. Debt is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total 
liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Market leverage, D/TAmarket, is debt divided by market value of assets (total 
assets minus book equity plus market value of equity). M/B is market value of total assets divided by book value of total assets. 
EFWAMB is external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio, which is calculated using equation (1). EBITDA is earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. PPE is net property and plant plus equipment. LogSale is the logarithm of 
revenue. State is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the state is the largest owner of the firm and the state ownership is larger 
than 30%, otherwise is zero. ReformD is a binary variable that is equal to1 for the years when a firm started non-tradable share 
reform to end of completion, otherwise is zero. t-statistics are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 10% 
statistical significance, respectively. 
   (D/TA)book, t  (D/TA)market, t 

































   -0.0004* 
(-1.74) 
 
        
EFWAMB t−1 
*ReformD 
  -0.0044* 
-(1.87) 
   -0.0065* 
-(1.91) 

























































        
Observation  10299 10299 10299  10299 10299 10299 
Adjusted R2 0.2533 0.2579 0.2591  0.3301 0.3314 0.3325 
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Table 6: Alternate measures of market timing  
This table presents aggregated estimates from the Fama-Macbeth annual regressions from 2001 to 2010. Book leverage, 
(D/TA)book, is defined as debt divided by total assets. Debt is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets 
minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Market leverage, (D/TA)market, is debt divided by market value of 
assets (total assets minus book equity plus market value of equity). M/B is market value of total assets divided by book value of 
total assets. EQUITYWMB is equity weighted average market-to-book ratio that is calculated by using only equity issue (e) 
weights in equation (1). EQUALWMB is equal weighted average market-to-book ratio that is calculated by using only equal 
weights in equation (1). EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. PPE is net property and plant 
plus equipment. LogSale is the logarithm of revenue. State is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the state is the largest owner of 
the firm and the state ownership is larger than 30%, otherwise is zero. ReformD is a binary variable that is equal to1 for the years 
when a firm started non-tradable share reform to end of completion, otherwise is zero. t-statistics are in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ 
and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
Panel A: EQUITYWMB 
  (D/TA)book, t    (D/TA)market, t  



























EQUITYWMB*Statet−1  -0.0001 
-(0.43) 
   -0.0010 
-(1.33) 
 
EQUITYWMB*ReformD   -0.0002 
-(1.11) 





























































        
Observation  10299 10299 10299  10299 10299 10299 
Adjusted R2 0.2325 0.2363 0.2371  0.3069 0.3086 0.3079 
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Panel B: EQUALWMB 
  (D/TA)book, t    (D/TA)market, t  
        



























EQUALWMB *Statet−1  -0.0032* 
-(1.68) 
   -0.0011 
-(1.28) 
 
EQUALWMB *ReformD   -0.0017* 
-(1.77) 



























































        
Observation  10299 10299 10299  10299 10299 10299 
Adjusted R2 
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Table 7: Determinants of cumulative changes in leverage  
This table reports the results from regressions with dependent variable being cumulative change in leverage over 3, 5, 7 and 9-year periods for 
firms listed on the Chinese stock markets. ‘First’ refers to the first instance of the leverage available in the sample. Book leverage, (D/TA)book, is 
defined as debt divided by total assets. Debt is defined as total assets minus book equity. Book equity is total assets minus total liabilities and 
preferred stock plus deferred taxes. Market leverage, (D/TA)market, is debt divided by market value of assets (total assets minus book equity plus 
market value of equity). ‘First’ refers to the first instance of the leverage available in the sample. M/B is market value of total assets divided by 
book value of total assets. EFWAMB is external finance weighted average market-to-book ratio, which is calculated using equation (1). EBITDA 
is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. PPE is net property and plant plus equipment. LogSale is the logarithm of 
revenue. State is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the state is the largest owner of the firm and the state ownership is larger than 30%, 
otherwise is zero. ReformD is a binary variable that is equal to 1 for the years 2005 and onward, otherwise is zero. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively.  
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Obs 655 490 373 251 
Adjusted R2 0.0986 0.1084 0.3509 0.3541 0.3950 0.3968 0.4356 0.4362 
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Obs 655 490 373 251 
Adjusted R2 0.0771 0.0837 0.1862 0.1850 0.2481 0.2479 0.2282 0.2253 
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Table 8: The effect of new equity and ownership on subsequent usage of capital  
This table reports the effect of new sources of funds categorized from secondary equity offerings and other capital on subsequent 
changes in assets and expenditures of Chinese listed firms, which is specified in equation (6) in text. ∑LTDebt is the cumulative 
change in long term debt. ∆Cash is the changes in cash holding. ∑CAPEX is the cumulative change in capital expenditures. ∆INV 
is the change in inventory. The eqt represents new capital from secondary equity offerings and oth represents new capital from 
other source, both of which are normalized by total assets. LO, MED, and HI represent low, middle and high level of state 
ownership each year respectively. The following variables are included in all regressions but not reported: Year fixed effects, 
log(total assets), LO, and HI. Panel A presents coefficients and t-stats using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors 
clustered by industry. Panel B presents the implied change in the dependent variables when equity capital (eqt) or other sources 
(oth) funds is increased by one dollar for each ownership group and p-values from comparing coefficients. Bold letters indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% level. The sample is the firms that have IPOs in the period from 2001 to 2010. 
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Panel B: Implied dollar changes and p-values from t-tests  
  Implied $ Change   p-Values (H0:  βi= βj ) 
    LO MED HI   LO HI  Eqt. Oth.                 
 t N  Eqt Oth Eqt Oth Eqt Oth   (β1 vs. β2) (β5 vs. β6)  (β1 vs. β5) (β2 vs. β6) 
∑LT Debt 
Reduction 
2 267  0.024 0.171 0.001 0.050 0.028 0.054   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
3 222  0.002 0.095 -0.022 0.055 0.004 0.031   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
4 213  -0.007 0.095 -0.019 0.056 -0.036 0.054   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
5 208  0.014 0.080 -0.039 0.066 0.015 0.044   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
∆Cash 2 267  0.223 0.023 0.073 0.026 0.310 0.073   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.27 
3 222  0.077 0.023 0.106 0.028 0.505 0.167   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
4 213  0.064 0.017 0.064 0.010 0.182 0.061   0.00 0.00  0.85 0.00 
5 208  0.045 0.033 0.107 0.011 0.123 0.116   0.00 0.05  0.00 0.00 
∑CAPEX 2 267  0.054 0.174 0.090 0.054 0.157 0.066   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
3 222  0.132 0.196 0.041 0.086 0.010 0.072   0.00 0.00  0.36 0.00 
4 213  0.171 0.212 0.072 0.036 0.044 0.116   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
5 208  0.102 0.254 -0.016 0.141 0.019 0.122   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
∆INV 2 267  0.055 0.199 0.022 0.029 0.046 0.028   0.00 0.05  0.00 0.00 
3 222  0.168 0.192 0.042 0.051 0.011 0.032   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
4 213  0.042 0.184 0.037 0.034 -0.012 0.039   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
5 208  -0.006 0.193 0.097 0.031 0.056 0.054   0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
 
